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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Evans, Austin Facility: Collins CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 16-R-2730 
Appearances: 
Decision appealed: 
Board Member(s) 
who participated: 
Papers considered: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Stephen K. Underwood, Esq. 
1395 Union Road 
West Seneca, New York 14224 
07-171-18 B 
July 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold to maximum 
expiration date. 
Smith, Alexander. 
Appellant's Brief received December 7, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Reconunendation. 
Reyords relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Final De' enni~ti9!1: ·--µ;? "9<1ersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
/_ · ~- Affifirmed _Vacated, remanded for de nQvo interview _Modified to 
I ; --- -
C ' .. 
>~ __:_--~ ?-- ~d . _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Qissioner 
lf;?V::.,rmed 
Commissioner 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!!:!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit' s Findings and the separ te findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate' s Counsel,. if any, on ) ·c.., i<:' . 
[)1-:trihution~ Aprcab: linit - Appcllanl - A.ppi.:llant's Counsel - Inst. Panik Fik- - C~ntrnl File 
1•-J1i!Crn1 ·111 ·:n181 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
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Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a hold to maximum expiration date. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision to deny 
Appellant’s immediate release back into the community was arbitrary and capricious, made in 
violation of applicable legal authority, and based solely upon the serious nature of the controlling 
conviction; (2) the Board did not provide sufficient weight to certain scores contained in 
Appellant’s COMPAS instrument, his programming, letters of support and release plans; (3) the 
Department failed to develop a Transitional Accountability Plan (TAP); (4) the Board’s decision 
lacked sufficient detail; (5) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; 
(6) certain issues were not discussed during the interview; (7) the Board’s decision was made in 
violation of Appellant’s due process rights; and (8) the Board failed to provide a record of its 
deliberations.  
As to the first two issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a 
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if 
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
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factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
The COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 
137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional 
consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of 
deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
 As to the third issue, the name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to 
“Offender Case Plan.”  Existing regulations refer to and require consideration of the “case plan.”  9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(b).  Accordingly, no further regulation is required.  An Offender Case Plan was 
prepared for Appellant and made available to the Board at the time of the interview. 
 As to the fourth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
As to the fifth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an 
improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine 
the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set 
forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Evans, Austin DIN: 16-R-2730
Facility: Collins CF AC No.: 07-171-18 B
Findings: (Page 3 of 3)
A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. 
Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  Appellant has 
not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).
            As to the sixth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
            As to the seventh issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released 
on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 
50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 
N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a 
possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due 
process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 As to the eighth issue, the Board is not required to record its internal deliberations or 
discussions.  Matter of Barnes v. New York State Div. of Parole, 53 A.D.3d 1012, 862 N.Y.S.2d 
639 (3d Dept. 2008); Borcsok v. New York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 961, 823 N.Y.S.2d 
310 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Collins v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733, 465 N.Y.S.2d 84 (4th Dept. 
1983). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
